## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CURTIS J. NEELEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CASE NO.
5:14-CV-05135
5 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONERS, FCC CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER, ET AL., US REPRESENTATIVE STEVE WOMACK, US
REPRESENTATIVE/SENATE CANDIDATE TOM
COTTON, US SENATOR MARK PRYOR, US ATTORNEY
GENERAL ERIC HOLDER, ESQ., HONORABLE JIMM LARRY HENDREN, DIANA E. MURPHY, PASCO M. BOWMAN, II, ROGER LELAND WOLLMAN, KERMIT EDWARD BYE, STEPHEN BREYER, STEVEN M. COLLOTON, ANTONIN SCALIE, RUTH B. GINSBURG, DENNY CHIN, ANTHONY KENNEDY, SAMUEL ALITO, RAYMOND W. GRUENDER, MICROSOFT CORPORATION, GOOGLE, INC.

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, SHOW CAUSE HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY L. BROOKS

May 27, 2014; 1:43 p.m.
FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS

FOR THE CURTIS J. NEELEY, JR.:
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Proceedings recorded in realtime via machine shorthand.

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THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. We are on the record this afternoon for a show cause hearing in the case of Curtis J. Neeley, Jr. versus what is styled as 5 Federal Communication Commissioners, the FCC chairman, several congressmen, senators, members of the Supreme Court, members of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Google, Inc., Microsoft Corporation, among others.

Present in the courtroom are the plaintiff, Mr. Curtis J. Neeley, Jr. No other party, no other defendant in this case, was asked to appear. The Court, at the time that it entered its show cause order, directed that the named defendants did not need to file an answer or otherwise appear in this action. Having said that, I believe that, for the record, attorney Josh Thane did enter an appearance for notice purposes only, and Mr. Thane, I note that you are present in the courtroom.

MR. THANE: That's correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Neeley was ordered to appear and show cause pursuant to the Court's order which was filed of record on May 16th, can be found as Document Number 4 in the court file. More specifically, Mr. Neeley was asked to appear and show cause as to why he should not, number one, be held in contempt or otherwise sanctioned for the delivery of a willful violation of the Court's prior order and injunction; number two, why he
should not be sanctioned pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for his filing of the current complaint; and number 3 , for why his current complaint should not be summarily dismissed.

Subsequent to the Court's entry of that order, Mr. Neeley responded with a reply to the show cause order, a brief in support. This morning Mr. Neeley -- or this afternoon Mr. Neeley has also provided the Court with several affidavits of support, and most recently he's provided the Court with a proffered amended and substituted complaint that he would like to file.

I would like to, Mr. Neeley, proceed somewhat more informally than we might otherwise proceed. I think that we can have somewhat of a conversational tone and demeanor. I think that my order to appear and show cause pretty much sets forth why I called you in here today and why I asked you to explain some of your actions. But $I$ do anticipate having some questions for you so that $I$ will understand better where you are coming from.

And before I ask you those questions throughout the course of this hearing, I would like to have you sworn in. So I'd ask Ms. Craig to swear you in, if you would remain seated obviously and raise your right hand.
(Whereupon Mr. Neeley was duly sworn.)
THE COURT: Mr. Neeley, I have read back through the
complaints that you have filed in this court, including a complaint that you filed in 2009 in Case Number 9-5151; a case you filed in 2012, Case Number 12-5074; another case that you filed in 2012 that was Case Number 12-5208. That was the case which ended with your causes of action being dismissed with prejudice and with Judge Hendren entering an order and an injunction requiring you not to file any related complaints in this matter without permission of the Court.

Then you attempted to file a case which was given, for file documentation purposes, was given the case number 13-MC-0066, the disposition of which was that Judge Hendren declined to give you permission to file that complaint because he found it to be in violation of the injunction.

And then right on the heels of Judge Hendren's order in that case, you filed another case in 2013 -- the case number's 13-5293 -- which Judge Hendren likewise dismissed with prejudice earlier this year. Less than two months after that, you filed the case which we're here on today, which is Case Number 14-5135.

I would note that in the prior case that resulted in Judge Hendren enjoining you from filing further actions that that case was appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of appeals and affirmed. You actually took the steps of attempting to seek a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and that was denied.

Mr. Neeley, I get the impression in reviewing your writings and the various complaints that you filed and the various responses that you have filed that you're a very intelligent person. I get the impression that you have done a lot of research. You've certainly attempted to research certain law. I'm not sure how precisely you use your citations, but nevertheless it's evident to me that you've done a lot of research.

It would also appear to me that you have some very sincerely held beliefs. All that being said -- and I've looked through all these complaints -- you've not stated any legally recognized cause of action.

I understand what you're getting at. I understand that at its core you are upset about two or three main things, and there's some tangents that offshoot from that in these different lawsuits that you filed. But a recurring theme seems to be that at one point in your life, you took artistic nude photography images and then since you were involved in an automobile accident and have recovered from that, you have developed a dislike of your name being associated with this artwork that you formally prepared or composed or photographed, whatever the proper term is, Mr. Neeley, and you've been seeking to have your name disassociated with that artwork such that people, when they run a Google search, for example, that your name "Neeley" is not associated with these former artworks
that you created. And you've gone about that several different ways of trying to get that connection broken.

I take it from what $I$ have read that in some instances you've been successful in getting the companies or the Internet search engines or what have you to cooperate with you in getting your name attribution with those images disassociated; other instances maybe it's still popping up. I'm not sure.

Another theme that I take from all of this litigation you have filed is that you disagree with how our federal copyright laws are currently either being interpreted and/or enforced and you, for example, believe that Google and Microsoft and these other Internet companies are violating the Federal Wiretap Act when -- and I'm not real clear on how all this works, but it's clear that you believe that they are violating federal wiretap prohibition act. It's pretty clear that you believe that these companies are violating both the Constitution and the copyright clause of the Constitution, as we11 as the copyright laws of the United States, all of that having to do with either the transmission of pornography in general or the retransmission of these figurenudes, as you call them, over the Internet that you believe that you have a copyright over and that despite what Courts may say about fair use that you don't believe that that is an exception that applies and you feel aggrieved by that.

My understanding in reading over these various complaints that you filed is that you don't believe that the Federal Communications Commission or its commissioners or its chairmen are doing their job in enforcing the law, and my understanding is that you believe that the judges are not interpreting the law correctly or not applying the law correctly. And for these and perhaps other reasons, you have brought this suit and other suits against them.

Before we get into the three reasons for why you were cited in here today, I would like to give you an opportunity just to explain. Forget the legalese, forget having to cite chapter and verse to a statute or a case, but just tell me and help me understand what your grievance is, number one; and number two, what it is you think that I can do about that, or -- and when I say "I," I mean this court and on what authority. Let's start with what your grievance is, Mr. Neeley.

MR. NEELEY: Thank you, your Honor. That's very close to what I believe I've done. The -- my grievance currently is that --

THE COURT: Mr. Neeley, would you pull that microphone kind of up in front of you and speak into it, if you could?

MR. NEELEY: I'm sorry. One of the things -- the things that I say right now, currently are in this, in the
complaint that I filed, that you're saying that I need to show cause for is that currently if you go to Google and type in my name and they are searching deviantart.com, it pulled up my name on a list, yes, it does. But then you link to it, there's -- you do not see any pictures, which is what I have done on the site. I said do not show any pictures. On these I have four graphics that I have placed on this site, and they are intended to be shown only to members of deviantart.com website. And if you go to Google and you type in the regular search engine, it comes up and it links to it and you don't see any pictures. But if you go to Google's image search, image search bypasses the fact that those pictures are not shown to anybody as they logged in. But if you go to Google, Google shows them.

THE COURT: If you go to what?
MR. NEELEY: If you go to Google Images, Google Images will show you images, the ones that, if you go to the website, you have to 10 g into the website and be a member of the website but not if you go to Google. If you go to Google, Google will show you.

THE COURT: I'd ask the marshal to assist him with the microphone over there. I am still having a little bit of trouble hearing him. Why don't you be sure that it's on.

MR. NEELEY: Hello. Is this better?
THE COURT: Yeah, that's better. Thank you. I'm
sorry.
So the problem seems to be corrected as it relates to an ordinary Google search, but if you do something called a search on Google Images, there is still an association between your name and those images?

MR. NEELEY: Yes. And the images are not images of naked people. They're images of graphics of FCC keeping a family safe from pornography and a graphic that is the -- well, it's more complicated than $I$ can get. It's a diagram that is an illustration for how to make wi-fi free. And it's a plan on how to make wi-fi -- as with windows, it makes FM radios like any FM radio in America could broadcast wi-fi already, today.

THE COURT: You lost me there, Mr. Neeley. Are you saying that whenever you do a search on Google Images that it pulls up this?

MR. NEELEY: These charts, yes, it does. And see, no one in America has -- understands right now how this works. But what happens is you can use time-based multiplexing and --

THE COURT: Time what?
MR. NEELEY: Time-based multiplexing, TBM. It's time-based. Like any -- currently the way the frequency, FM distributes the frequency, FM distributes the frequency, through multiplexing. Well, a third is time-based multiplexing, which is a relatively new event. That's how we got Internet the way around.

The fact is that $F M$ radios could also transmit wi-fi at the same time as carrying audio on their current radio system. And it would be -- it would make it basically, it would make wi-fi something that would be everywhere. If you get $F M$ radio, you'd able to get wi-fi, anywhere.

THE COURT: Why are you aggrieved by that?
MR. NEELEY: I'm not aggrieved by that. I'm -- I'm aggrieved by Google bypassing my having placed those and said "Do not show to anybody unless they're a member of this website," and they showed them anyway. And that is against the 1aw.

THE COURT: I thought you just said when you did a Google image search that it -- that it pulled up this instructions for how to convert any FM signal to wi-fi.

MR. NEELEY: No. No, sir. Windows pulls up my profile on DeviantArt and has a placeholder that says you have to be logged in to see these images. However, if you go to Google Images, it does not. It bypasses the password provision and pulls through the images.

THE COURT: A11 right. Let me see if I can get at it this way. At the present time if you go to Google and do a normal Google search, is there an association currently between your name and these nude images as you have alleged in prior 1awsuits?

MR. NEELEY: There are not unless you -- unless you
type in my name and the word "nude," then there is.
THE COURT: So if you type in your name and the word "nude," then some images do come up?

MR. NEELEY: Right. And one thing is that if you go and look at the images, there is an image that they are showing in searches for my name and "nude" that does -- it is a nude that I did and that I gave to Wikipedia for an SIP entry, and they removed -- they actually have removed my name from it. I asked -- I gave them, said take my name off, do -- I said, you can use my current -- CN foundation and that will be okay, but don't put my name with it. And so they have it. And if you go on a web page, my name is not anywhere on that web page, but it's still coming back in the Google search for my name. And that has showing this image in a way that $I$ have asked not to be done, which is a violation of the law.

THE COURT: What law?
MR. NEELEY: 2511, 182511.
THE COURT: We11, that's the Federal Wiretap Act.
MR. NEELEY: Crimina1 law 18 2511. It is a felony if you -- the thing is I talked to the -- I asked the FBI and the attorney and the -- I asked them to prosecute it, and they said they couldn't because the only punishment for it was a lawsuit. They said -- they advised me to get an attorney and file a 1awsuit.

THE COURT: We11, except for statutes which provide
for a specific type and form of civil relief, a private citizen cannot step into the shoes of the government and prosecute a crime. That's what the United States attorney's office is for. And you have made references in your complaint about how the Courts have failed to prosecute this or failed to prosecute that, and you need to understand that the Court doesn't prosecute.

The Court sits as a court and oversees the prosecution of criminal cases, but the Court is not in the role of a prosecutor. The Court is a neutral arbiter of the facts and the law. And so your problem on that particular issue, Mr. Neeley, is that you don't have standing to prosecute a crime, and this Court doesn't have standing in the absence of being an overseer of the Government's action, and neutral in the Government's action, to grant that type of relief.

MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, actually in the statute 18 2520, it gives anybody -- says anybody who this has been done to may bring a civil cause.

THE COURT: We11, that is the private -- there is a civil provision, you're right. That is Section 2520. But the concept, Mr. Neeley, there of the Federal Wiretap Act and the whole -- really the whole purpose of the Wiretap Act is to regulate and otherwise prohibit the interception of contemporaneous communications. There's nothing about the facts in which you have alleged in your complaint that Google
or anyone else is attempting to contemporaneously intercept any communications that are protected by that statute.

And I might also add, Mr. Neeley, that if you look at, I believe it is Subsection (1)(g) of 2511 -- for the record, this is 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(g), there's an exception for communications that are readily accessible to the general pub1ic.

I guess, Mr. Neeley, I -- today is not going to -- is not intended to delve down into a debate about what the law is or what the law should be. I'm just really interested in understanding where you're coming from, and I want to try to communicate with you so that I can be sure that I understand what your grievances are and to try to better understand what it is that you want the United States District Court to do about it.

And with regard to this notion that Google or anyone else is violating Section 2511, number one, that's the criminal part. You don't have standing to prosecute a crime; this Court doesn't have standing to prosecute a crime. So even if it is a crime, there isn't anything that you or I can do about it. The U.S. attorney is the one that needs to bring those charges.

I assure you that the U.S. attorney in this district is very vigorous about pursuing various types of illegal pornography, and in my short time on the bench, that is 40 to 50 percent of the criminal cases, as sadly as this is,

Mr. Neeley, where I've conducted criminal sentencings has involved child pornography. And I assure you that from everything that I've seen -- and I'm not privy to what the U.S. attorney does, but from everything that I've seen in this courtroom, they take a very vigorous stance when it comes to issues involving illegal pornography.

So if there is a violation of any law, criminal violation of any law -- or a violation of any criminal statute I guess is how I should say it -- A, that's the U.S. attorney's job; B, as best I can tell, this area, especially as it relates to child pornography, is something that they have a high interest in pursuing. But your repeated filings of lawsuits of the sort that you have made are simply clogging up the system. They're taking the time of this Court from other matters, including the matters that the U.S. attorney is prosecuting, people that have violated statutes, from working their way through the system as swiftly and efficiently as they can.

So, so far you've told me about your grievance as it relates to violation of the Federal Wiretap Act. I understand that. I hopefully have explained at least my understanding of that.

What other grievances do you have?
MR. NEELEY: I -- excuse me, your Honor. I believe that when Google -- Google is doing better than Microsoft, but when Google and Microsoft continue to return my name -- say my
name is on a page that it is not on, that is a computer fraud.
THE COURT: And what statute do you base that on?
MR. NEELEY: Arkansas -- oh, dear.
THE COURT: The Arkansas computer fraud statute?
MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That you cited --
MR. NEELEY: 301, I think.
THE COURT: I can't remember whether it was in the most recent complaint that you filed or not. I've read so many of them recently --

MR. NEELEY: It was in --
THE COURT: -- but I recal1 --
MR. NEELEY: It was in the most recent complaint on about Page 3 .

THE COURT: This is a federal court. I don't have jurisdiction to enforce the Arkansas code. It's kind of the very same story as it relates to the Wiretap Act.

MR. NEELEY: Excuse me, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me finish, Mr. Neeley.
MR. NEELEY: Excuse me.
THE COURT: Even if I did have jurisdiction over the state criminal law, which $I$ don't, the criminal aspect of it would have to be prosecuted by a state prosecutor. You don't have standing to prosecute the state, a suspected violation of a state crime, nor does this Court have the ability to
prosecute.
Now, there is a civil component to that state computer fraud statute as well, but if you go back and look at the elements of how a privately aggrieved person can go about bringing a suit, I don't see that you have met the elements laid out in that state statute. And just -- and we're not being super legal here today, I don't suppose, but you haven't established jurisdiction in this court for a civil violation of the Arkansas computer fraud statute.

MR. NEELEY: But, your Honor, I don't -- I hadn't thought about that. I don't understand what -- I'm lost there, but I felt that because Google and Microsoft are in a different district, they're in different states, but the business they do is here, that it would give us jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Well, there most certainly is a concept known as diversity of citizenship. Whether or not you can invoke federal jurisdiction to pursue civil enforcement of an Arkansas criminal statute is an interesting legal question. I think that I need not get any farther than the fact that you've not appropriately pled diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in your complaint.

All right. You're critical of Google, and you explained that one of those grievances is under the federal wiretap prohibition act. The second grievance you indicated was based on the Arkansas computer fraud act.

What other grievances do you have, Mr. Neeley?
MR. NEELEY: I suppose I -- in the complaint I also said that -- that the -- when judges remain on the bench beyond the age of 70 , they are violating their oath of office. And they are not following the Constitution where it says that they will act only while in good conduct, or during good behavior.

THE COURT: And on what authority do you interpret Article III of the Constitution when it says "during period of good behavior" to mean age 70? Where did you come up with age 70?

MR. NEELEY: I compared that to the majority of the rest of the world. I compared it to Europe. There are 33 United States states they have that, and that's what I'm saying. I have those listed in there, but I don't remember if the -- like Poland, Australia, Great Britain. Both -- I am looking to other countries at their laws and what they do.

THE COURT: We11, Mr. Neeley, you know, when you bring a lawsuit, you have to be able to establish that someone has, in effect, in a civil case, especially if it's a tort-type case, you have to first establish a duty and then you have to establish that you have suffered some sort of damage and then you have to establish that there's some sort of connection between this duty and the damage that you've suffered. And, you know, just because any average, ordinary citizen like you and me believes that the law ought to be something else, it
doesn't mean that that gives you standing, nor does that mean that you have the elements to go forward with a lawsuit. And just because you believe that judges should not continue to serve past age 70 based on your interpretation of Article III of the Constitution, that doesn't mean that's what the law is. And even if you could do that, what is it that you would have me do? And when I say "me," I mean the Court.

MR. NEELEY: I don't suppose there is anything that you could do. I apologize. I was confused, I suppose. I thought that I had to show that -- I have no idea why I do it.

THE COURT: Okay. What other grievances do you have, Mr. Neeley?

MR. NEELEY: The fact that United States Constitution says that we give artists or authors the right to control their work for a time, and that does not happen. Because as Judge Hendren ruled in 5151 that you read through, he ruled that Act 106 -- or 107 -- Section 106(a) did not apply online. And it -- basically I believe that that is -- I mean, it was a correct reading, that's -- it's one of those things where the law says this, but then it has an exception. It says "except for," and then it says something that means online. And -- but that seems to me as if, if you can't have a right to -- you can't have the right that you can't have online. You can do it anywhere else, but online, no.

To me, the Constitution applies online or not online.

And where the -- and I agree that what he said was correct, but the way they wrote the law was such that it would possibly exempt online, and Judge Hendren's ruling is the only case that ever dealt with that law, ever, since it was ever -- since passing in 1990. The first time it's ever been addressed. And he said -- and I can understand he was saying they do not apply to online. But to me a right you can't -- the Constitution doesn't -- cannot have the right. They exist for people for a time; that doesn't apply when it's online.

THE COURT: Well, the copyright clause of the Constitution says what it says. More legs are given to that in the various copyright laws that congress has enacted, the patent laws that congress has enacted, and other types and forms of intellectual property laws that congress has enacted.

In the case that you filed in 2009, I believe that was 5151 ; is that right?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: That case was decided and ruled upon by Judge Hendren for the reasons stated in his dismissal order. Did you appeal that case?

MR. NEELEY: I did, your Honor.
THE COURT: And what was the result of that case on appea1?

MR. NEELEY: It was affirmed.
THE COURT: And I know you've done some research on
this term known as res judicata.
MR. NEELEY: Oh, yes, sir, I know what that means.
THE COURT: Yeah. So that issue's been decided, and we could go back and debate that, we could go out for a cup of coffee tomorrow and debate whether that was right or whether it is not right. And I know that you have some very strongly held beliefs about that, but that case has been decided.

MR. NEELEY: It does. But when that case was decided -- and I agree it was decided correctly -- the thing is you can't re- -- you know, beat the dead horse, as it would be. But the problem is that that means -- the fact that that case was decided the way it was means that congress did not ever follow the copyright clause and the authorization to protect the rights of others. It's still there saying to protect them. Congress cannot -- protect the rights of others, but they have not.

THE COURT: We11, what would you have this Court do about that, assuming that is true? Are you asking this Court to order congress to pass laws?

MR. NEELEY: I am asking for the Court to find that the congress -- well, my congressman and senator should be fined for not having -- a law.

THE COURT: And under what authority would I do that? And when I say "I," I mean the Court.

MR. NEELEY: Under having perjured themselves.

THE COURT: Having perjured themselves?
MR. NEELEY: Upholding the Constitution they have not done. If they have not attempted to protect artists, they haven't done what the Constitution says.

THE COURT: Well, we live in a very divided time politically, Mr. Neeley, and I bet if we went to the street and gathered up a hundred people, they would have anywhere from two to a hundred different reasons why congress is not doing their job. But I don't understand on what authority this Court would have to compel someone in the congress to do anything. Do you?

MR. NEELEY: I was hoping that we could -- they could do a order of damages, even if it were just a dollar, but that would be reexamined in a year, or six months.

THE COURT: We11, I read that in one of the pleadings that you filed, but it just doesn't work that way.

MR. NEELEY: We11, I didn't realize that.
THE COURT: Number one, they're immune from suit, for acts or inacts in their capacity as an official of the United States. So you can't sue a congressman for introducing a bil1 that you don't like or that you think violates the Constitution. And the opposite of that is likewise true: You can't sue them for not introducing a bill or not passing a law that you personally would like to see them pass because you believe it would be in furtherance of the Constitution.

What you can do is what thousands of Americans do
every day and that is lobby congress. Many different ways to lobby congress. But even if I were inclined to your way of thinking, Mr. Neeley, there's not a piece of paper that I can write out and sign my name to that would have the ability or effect of making any representative or senator do anything.

MR. NEELEY: Yes, your Honor. I see that now that that is a -- was a mistake on my part. I apologize.

THE COURT: What other grievances do you have, Mr. Neeley?

MR. NEELEY: I believe that -- I believe that covers everything. I suppose that's it. I probably should have just -- I apologize.

THE COURT: Well, let's turn now to the reasons that the Court cited you in today. And before I get into that, I would like to know a little bit more about you personally, Mr. Neeley, and I met with you before we went on the record to kind of explain this. This will help me understand where you're coming from a little bit more as I approach the issues that are set forth in the show cause order. But if for some reason you'd prefer not to answer them, then you just tell me you'd prefer not to. I don't mean to invade your privacy or to embarrass you in any way.

MR. NEELEY: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: I understand that you were in a very serious car wreck several years ago; is that right?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: What year was that?
MR. NEELEY: September 3rd, 2002.
THE COURT: Somewhere along the way, I saw a
photograph of your car, and it's very difficult to believe that you survived that. But I'm very thankful that you did.

MR. NEELEY: Thank you, your Honor. I was in a coma for six weeks, and my wife did a DNR order and had the respirator disconnected.

THE COURT: And you had the what?
MR. NEELEY: Respirator disconnected. And --
THE COURT: They thought that you were so far gone that they were going to pull the plug on you, so to speak?

MR. NEELEY: They did, yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you showed them, I guess?
MR. NEELEY: We11, not exactly. My brother said I squeezed his hand. The judge -- or not the judge. The surgeon attending said that happens when you're dying. And he asked him to look at it again. They asked me if I was there, to give them a thumbs-up, and I did.

THE COURT: That's amazing. Did that happen here in Arkansas, or was that when you were in California?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir, it was here.
THE COURT: Here in Arkansas?
MR. NEELEY: It was here.

THE COURT: Mr. Neeley, I spent over 24 years in private practice before I was appointed to this position, and a large part of my practice and private practice was representing people who were injured through the fault of other people, through a negligent 18 -wheeler or through allegedly by the hands of the negligent doctor or allegedly by the hands of a defective product, many different theories. But the point is I represented a lot of people who had some very, very serious injuries that they/we alleged to be caused by some other person or some other corporation. So I feel that I have a certain amount of empathy for you and what you've gone through.

I have had the -- I've had the -- I've been in the position of representing people who have gone through those injuries and come out on the other side with brain injury. I represented a gentleman within the last six or seven years, as a matter of fact, who was in a prolonged coma, not as long as yours, but I believe in the range of three or four weeks. Doctors said that he, if he survived would, you know, would basically be a vegetable.

This gentleman was a very intelligent person before the accident, and thank God he not only survived but made remarkable progress. He was ultimately left with several neurological-related impairments which left him -- I would analogize it to someone that's had a stroke. He couldn't walk very well, he had difficulty speaking, he had difficulty
formulating words in his mouth. But if you gave him time, the intellectual part of his brain worked just fine. And he was as smart after the accident as he was before the accident.

But whenever you suffer a brain injury, I've learned that it can do some very strange things to your brain. For example, like in this gentleman's case, the intellectual part of his brain worked just fine, but he lost a lot of cognitive abilities. He lost the ability to, you know, see two facts and understand what their connection was. It horribly affected his emotional coping capabilities. It horribly affected his, what I would generically call his filters. He could just blow up on somebody, you know, in a second because he didn't have any social filters.

Brain injuries and the healing of brain injuries can be very mysterious things. What I'm interested in knowing from you, given that I feel like I have some understanding of that, and I read something in one of your pleadings about how you must have been under the care -- not under the care, but you must have had a guardianship over you at some point in time; is that right?

MR. NEELEY: I did, yes, sir. Yes, your Honor, I did.

THE COURT: From what year, year to year was that, Mr. Neeley?

MR. NEELEY: 2003 to 2006, your Honor.

THE COURT: And did you have a guardian of your estate and over your person, or just one or the other?

MR. NEELEY: Both.
THE COURT: And what happened in 2006 that caused those disabilities, those legal disabilities to be removed?

MR. NEELEY: I -- I went to court, I suppose.
THE COURT: And took action to have them removed?
MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: A11 right. Mr. Neeley, do you have any -- other than obviously -- and for the record, I should note that you're in a wheelchair today. This car accident that you were in took your legs; is that right?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, your Honor -- wel1, no, your Honor. Indirectly it did. It paralyzed me from the midback down and then I got pressure sores on my feet and they wouldn't heal and wouldn't heal. So I just asked them to cut off my legs.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. NEELEY: And they did, and so indirectly, I guess, yes.

THE COURT: Do you know or have you ever been diagnosed as having any neurocognitive impairments?

MR. NEELEY: I believe so. They -- I had -- for a time I took a medication for -- to make, like you were saying, the filters, a filter -- kind of a filter medication that would keep me from saying things. And I have had difficulty with
that, but I think I've gotten significantly better.
THE COURT: Mr. Neeley, I've tried lawsuits as a lawyer throughout my entire career in private practice, and thus far, I've had an opportunity to preside over three jury trials as a judge. And in almost every trial that I've ever been in, whether it be as a lawyer or on the bench, there is a passage or a part of a standard jury instruction that goes something to the effect of that you, the jury, are obligated to abide by the law as the judge instructs you, whether you like that law or don't like that law or wish that that law were something else, even if you know that it's not the law.

Juries are charged with the responsibility to determine fact issues. The Court, or the judge, is obligated to instruct the jury as to what the law is, and juries are told that, like I said, it doesn't really matter what they think the law is; they're obligated to take that law and apply it to the facts before them.

As a plaintiff in a lawsuit, you have an obligation to set forth in your initial pleading known as a complaint, a recognized cause of action on the face of the complaint. I know you've researched some of this stuff, but in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, you're required to state -and you're required to make a short and plain statement of your claims showing that you are entitled to relief. And that statement must contain sufficient facts on the face of that
initial pleading, known as the complaint, to state a plausible claim that demonstrates that the defendant or defendants that you have sued are liable for the misconduct that you've accused them of.

Now, they're just allegations. And the Court, at the initial review phase, must look at those and assume that they're true, assume that the facts that you have stated are true. The test is whether, if you take the facts as stated in the complaint as true, has the complaint stated a recognized action.

If your complaint doesn't do that or if later on the Court takes and considers some preliminary evidence, or not preliminary evidence but the parties submit affidavits and depositions and that sort of thing, and if the Court at that later opportunity decides that there isn't any fact question for the jury to decide, then your case never makes it far enough to where you are entitled, you or anyone else, Mr. Neeley, are entitled to a jury.

Another common theme that I saw through your complaints is that you've been deprived of your Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. And understand that while the Seventh Amendment is very jealous of its protection of all of our rights to a civil jury, you're only entitled to a jury to the extent that there's a fact question. And if your complaint, or the evidence that you develop after filing a
complaint, does not lead to any remaining genuine issues of fact, then the Court under the Rules is obligated to dismiss it. And so whether you agree -- like we tell these jurors, whether you agree that that's what the 1 aw is, whether you wish the law was different, doesn't really matter. And I don't mean that in a mean way. I mean that the Court is obligated to look at the rules and the law and to apply that to what's before it. The Court can't act on what you would like the law to be. Do you understand that?

MR. NEELEY: I do. The one thing I don't understand is how is it that they can allege that I -- my name's on a page and to reach those images, return those images when my name is not on a page. I mean, most of the time Google has stopped that; however, there are simple cases where they have not. And I have kindly said, guys, would you please take my -- my name's not on this page, it's a bigger cache, do something. But they have not. And so they keep alleging it's there.

THE COURT: I don't know the answer to that, Mr. Neeley. You know, I don't have very good understanding. I've never had a case like that before. I don't really understand whether Google merely provides the computing power against which their search engines operate or whether there's some other entity, whether it be a company that sells a service somehow associates names with products or what have you. I really don't know how that part works.

What I can say is this: Google, like any other company, if they're not providing a good service or if they're finding a service that you think is a bad service or they don't operate the way that you would like them to operate, go to a different service.

MR. NEELEY: My problem is that children who are in schools, my children who type in my name will see images that are not on pages that my name's on there.

THE COURT: But Mr. Neeley, if we start down that path, one of the tragic things that I have presided over so far are some of these criminal sentencings, and people stand right here before the Court and they or their attorney will tell me about these bad things, in that case obviously criminal things, that they've done. And they ask the Court to have mercy in the sentencing because they're going to be gone for a long time from their kids and their family. And I take that into consideration. And I can't imagine what it would be like to be sent away, when your child is very young, for something bad, and you come back five years later or ten years later and you try to normalize your relationship with your family.

The bad thing that those criminal defendants have done is always going to be there, and that person can't go around to Google and every other search engine and say, would you please disassociate my name with all the news stories back at the time because I don't want my 10-year-old to know that I
robbed a bank or that I sold drugs.
And Mr. Neeley, I'm not trying to analogize what you did to something criminal. I'm just trying to make the point that, A, I don't know what Google could do about it; but if they did, can you imagine what a ruckus it would be trying to make sure that every bad thing that someone ever did is erased from the Internet.

MR. NEELEY: The fact is that currently they have just lost a case in Europe and have to do exactly that. If it is not relevant, then it's not that -- gatherers of links to places are required now to -- unless it's relevant news at the time, they need to remove links.

THE COURT: We11, that may very wel1 be and perhaps I'm not just -- not very well educated about that. I don't know that that is the 1 aw here.

MR. NEELEY: It only happened -- it's not the law here. What I'm saying is that they gather links, that's fine. The fact is they can't -- they don't go back and erase -- the fact is, what $I$ 'm saying on my case, if I -- my name's on a page, then so be it, you know, but like you said, you can't go back and change the past. But my name has been taken off a page completely, 100 percent, and the only place that Google is able to get anything on my name on it is they say, well, four years ago, you had your name on there and so therefore we're going to continue to return that page. But even though it's
not there now, it was five years ago. The fact is I spent a great deal of time in talking with the Wikipedia foundation to have them remove my name, and they have made sure it's not -- they don't have a history of it being there. They have moved it altogether and yet it still comes up in the Google search engine.

THE COURT: In your complaints you've cited to a bunch of different federal statutes, several different cases. I'm not aware that any of those, any of those citations gives this Court the authority to enjoin Google from having its computer systems return a particular search result. But I would suggest this: There are probably -- not probably. There are some very, very, very smart intellectual property lawyers out there in this country. And if Google is violating some statute, some law, some legal principle that a citizen such as yourself has standing to bring a claim in court, there are people, lawyers out there that can advise you about that.

And typically -- and I don't know anything about Google, but -- and I hear you saying that you've done this, but typically you start with asking them nicely before you haul off and sue them. And one problem in every lawsuit -- and I don't mean to give you legal advice here, but one thing that I've noticed in every lawsuit that you file is you've kind of taken a shotgun approach, and the shotgun pattern has gotten progressively larger every time you file a lawsuit. And if
that is what your concern is, is that your name is still being somehow associated with something, ask Google nicely, A, if they -- if that's physically possible or engineering-wise whether it's possible to make that disassociation.

And then if you know that it is and they still won't do it, then go talk to a lawyer to see if there's some legal remedy that you have, or whether that's just the way iife is until you go to congress and have them change the law. But you can't file the sort of lawsuits that you have filed that don't recite on the face of your complaint a basis that would give a Court like me the ability to do anything.

I hear what you're saying, and I'm empathetic toward you, and I know that you're sincere, but you just haven't given the Court any basis on which to grant you the relief that you're wanting.

MR. NEELEY: I understand that, I suppose.
THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple other personal questions. And again, you don't have to answer these if you don't want to.

What sort of financial resources do you have? Do you have the financial resources to go out and hire a lawyer if you wanted to?

MR. NEELEY: No, sir, I do not. I have a hundred and -- \$1,017 per month Social Security.

THE COURT: How much?

MR. NEELEY: \$1,017 per month Social Security and $\$ 100$ of alimony. That's all.

THE COURT: Did you get any sort of settlement out of this car wreck that you were in many years ago?

MR. NEELEY: I did. That is -- was used to build a home, and that home is now with my ex-wife.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. NEELEY: I have had the -- my -- the people who are around me, my friends, basically told me to -- that if this is going to be dismissed to give up, and I can do that. But I don't understand how -- I mean, I can try the nice approach, you know, again, but it seems to me like it would be so easy to stop doing that they don't. It makes it more -- makes me more angry, that it would be so easy to stop, but they don't.

Anyway, the fact is my name is not on the page and yet the picture returns in searches for my name.

THE COURT: We11, again, I can understand how that would be aggravating, and I understand how when you have been horribly injured through no fault of your own like you have that you have a lot of -- well, I don't know you, Mr. Neeley. So I shouldn't say that. But -- and when I was in private practice, $I$ had clients who had been injured and they didn't have any family that was close by and so they ended up -- and my mother did the same thing after my dad died. They sudden1y just start thinking about things and it just kind of snowballs,
you know, in their head, and it takes on kind of, you know, a life of its own after a while. And, you know, it appears to me from reading -- and the extent that you've gone through to do the research -- that you've really kind of obsessed about some of this. And I believe that it's sincere, but I think that it's gotten out of hand. And it -- well, let's get into the specifics of why I asked you to come before the Court today.

And I appreciate you sharing with me all that you have shared with me because I think that I understand what your grievances are, and I hope that you understand that I'm not just some incompassionate person that reads papers and tries to get rid of cases but that $I$ have to play by the rules, too, and that there are certain orders that are in place, there are certain rules that are in place, there are laws and precedent that I'm obliged to go by. And even if I felt as though there were merit to some of these beliefs and approaches that you believe in, there's nothing that this Court has the power or ability to do. But I think that $I$ have a better sense of where you're coming from, if nothing else.

Getting to the three elements in the order to appear and show cause -- and you have proffered for the Court certain affidavits of support that I'm collectively going to mark as Court's Exhibit Number 1 for the record. You've also tendered a supplemental amended complaint that I'm going to mark as Court's Exhibit Number 2 for the record. And I will look
through and read your proffered supplemental complaint after the hearing today.

But the first thing that I asked you to show cause about was why you should not be held in contempt or otherwise sanctioned for the deliberate and willful violation of this Court's prior order and injunction.

Mr. Neeley, do you recall -- well, I know you do -but on February 15th of 2013 in Case Number 12-5208, the Court entered an order and an injunction. It was Document Number 58 in that court case file. It was attached as Exhibit 1 to the order to appear and show cause.

You were aware at the time that you filed this complaint on March 6th of this year that Judge Hendren had ordered you to not file any further complaints or other pleadings related to the same subject matter as your prior litigation. You were aware of that, were you not?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir, I was aware. I believe I followed that. I --

THE COURT: And you believe what?
MR. NEELEY: I believe that that's why I did it. I don't believe that's the same thing.

THE COURT: Mr. Neeley, you have used -- you've named different defendants, you have approached some of these arguments from different angles, but at its core, your grievance -- grievances, plural, that you've explained to me
today are essentially the same grievances as you brought before Judge Hendren in 2012 in Case Number 12-5208, are they not?

MR. NEELEY: No, sir. In the past I had published pictures of figurenudes. Naked pictures I had published on the Internet, and I was selling them. And when I was, Google came in and showed them to everybody and that's why the first one was, I said my right to control my art should not have been violated.

And it had nothing to do with what -- now currently, and the current complaint has nothing to do with naked art, but it has art that I have put in behind passwords. And they are now going past the password protection and getting those and showing them. And they do that for not only me, but they do that for other people. And it causes -- anyway, it's not the same. And that is the only thing that the affidavits say. It is not the same.

THE COURT: Mr. Neeley, I don't say this to be mean but, you know, when I read your complaints, I can read and comprehend the words that you write. But whenever I try to analyze the legal framework and figure out what your -- what legal relief you're seeking, it makes no sense to me.

The same is largely true for the other complaints that you filed, including the complaint in 12-5208. But I find that they all arise out of this notion that you had these figurenudes out there at one point in time and your name has
been associated with those figurenudes, and in some shape, form, or fashion you feel aggrieved by that and you're asking for these different remedies. And the remedies in this, in the instant case, the one that you filed a few weeks ago, may be somewhat different. They may cite a different statute or what have you, but it all arises out of the same, same underlying nexus.

I think what Judge Hendren was trying to state was at that point he didn't feel that if you had -- for example, let's say you had another car wreck, God forbid, and it was a truck wreck caused by a company that operated this eighteen-wheeler that ran over you, and this eighteen-wheeler was headquartered in New Mexico and therefore you had diversity of citizenship and the minimal dollar limitation for jurisdictional purposes was met and therefore federal court jurisdiction was proper. I don't think Judge Hendren would have had a problem with you suing for personal injuries because you had been involved in a truck wreck.

But I think that the Court's order clearly contemplated that you not file another lawsuit without proffering it to the Court first to determine whether or not it was related. That was the whole purpose for why the Court asked that you let the Court have an opportunity to look at it before you file it.

You knew that, did you not? You knew from Judge

Hendren's order that the --
MR. NEELEY: I did.
THE COURT: -- Court wanted to prescreen --
MR. NEELEY: I did.
THE COURT: -- any complaints that had to do with this notion about the figurenudes and the name association with your name and that sort of thing, did you not?

MR. NEELEY: I did. That is not in the current complaint, although. I mean, it is not there. It's -- I am saying the graphics that $I$ have put behind password protection are being returned. Not -- there are no nudes. Now, the nudes that returned are not -- should not be because that is not -- my name is not on the page. That's a whole different issue. But this is them bypassing the password protection.

THE COURT: The second thing that you were cited to appear and show cause for was why you should not be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for filing this instant complaint, the one that you filed on May 6th of this last year. Have you reviewed Rule 11?

MR. NEELEY: I have. I don't believe that the complaint $I$ did, $I$ don't believe $I$ had any intention to violate Rule 11. I signed it. It was not just to cause harm. I was looking for relief. And $I$ would still be if what is missed is that I believe they shouldn't bypass passwords.

If an artist says don't show this to anybody except
members of this site, that should not be shown to anonymous people, who will be children and other people.

But basically the fact that they are doing it, they are bypassing the password protection that is allowed on the sites and my claim would be that I would like to have them not do that anymore. And to me if there's some other way I could say it, like it's fraud or it's, you know, some other way to say it. But basically it's wrong to violate somebody's desire to tell only people who are members of the website and not random, anonymous people. And that was what I would like to have done and that, I don't believe, should violate Rule 11. I signed everything.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Neeley, you -- it's hard for me to look at your complaint and label anything as a legal cause of action, but you filed for such things as that your parental child-rearing rights have been infringed. You've brought up, once again, this notion that there are problems with the way that the copyright clause of the Constitution and the very copyright laws are -- either have been interpreted or that there hasn't been legislation properly enacted to give any true meaning to them.

You've suggested that the Courts or the FCC or that someone has failed to recognize the fundamental human right of disassociating in more what you believe to be immoral artwork with one's name. You've alleged violations of so-called
communications crimes against Google under 18 U.S.C. Section 2511. I believe you -- I could be mistaken on this, Mr. Neeley --

MR. NEELEY: No, sir.
THE COURT: -- but I believe that you've sued Google under that very same statute previously. You have sued under the copyright protection 1 aws at 17 U.S.C. Section 106(a). I believe that you've done that previously as well.

I believe that in your very first lawsuit back in 2009 in Case 5151 that you sued under 17 U.S.C. Section 106 (a), did you not?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir. That was one of the many complaints that I think that's where -- it ended on that and, yes, sir, I --

THE COURT: And Judge Hendren said don't file any more claims or causes of action based on -- that you've previously litigated, correct?

MR. NEELEY: I believe so, yes, sir.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. NEELEY: Which would have been, I thought, copyright, $106(a)$.

THE COURT: You sued, you know, on this -- and this is not the first time that you've sued on this, but I think that you also sued under this notion of Article III of the Constitution when it talks about judges serving during periods
of good behavior that that should be reinterpreted to mean not past the age of 70 . Is that the first time you've ever alleged something like that?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You think it is the first time?
MR. NEELEY: This time?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. NEELEY: I think it is. I think in the past I may have said something inappropriate in court, but I never -I never did in the filing.

THE COURT: The -- in the case 13-MC-0066 and/or case 13-5293, that was the complaint where you sought permission to file it, but it wasn't filed. And then the second one was the one where you turned around a couple of weeks later and filed a lawsuit anyway.

Did you not bring up this notion about the oligarchies and that they should be forced to retire at age 70 ?

MR. NEELEY: I have no idea. I have -- I might have looked over that again, but I have no idea. I mean, if I did, I did. I don't -- I don't remember.

THE COURT: Well, I could go on and on of the different sort of things that you have alleged. It's difficult for me to understand and put a label as a cause of action on them. But the essence of Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Neeley, is that it ought not to be that just
because you have enough money to pay the filing fee that you can walk down to the courthouse and file anything on a piece of paper and start the legal process.

You have to have some genuine, legitimate basis in law and fact to go along with your lawsuit. You can't just haul off and sue senators and judges and FCC commissioners when there isn't an adequate basis in fact in law.

And I realize that you believe that there is a basis in fact, but Rule 11 requires that your legal theory be either well grounded or be in good faith based on what you -- and I'm going to butcher this paraphrasing -- but a good faith proposition for a change in the law.

For example, if you believe that an act that has been passed is unconstitutional, you could be the very first person to challenge it, and there wouldn't be any law necessarily on which you would base that and so you may file a complaint challenging the constitutionality of something. But even there, there's a procedure for doing those sorts of things and there's a procedure for how you state them. And Mr. Neeley, you haven't stated, as best I can tell, any bona fide, legitimate, legally recognized causes of action.

I think that you would be enormously well served if you would take these sincerely held beliefs that you have and go run them past a lawyer first. Why do you not think that would be a good idea?

MR. NEELEY: I can't afford a lawyer.
THE COURT: Well, so is it then the law that everyone that can't afford a lawyer is, no matter how well meaning they are, has the right to go down and file a bunch of gobbledygook on paper and clog up the court system? Do you believe that that's the way our system should operate?

MR. NEELEY: No.
THE COURT: The third reason why I asked you to appear and show cause today, Mr. Neeley, was to state why your current complaint should not be summarily dismissed. As I've already indicated, I've read over it several times. I've compared it to your prior lawsuits, and I think that it should be summarily dismissed for any number of reasons, not the least of which is that, as I interpret the injunction that was in place, you shouldn't have filed it without getting advance permission of the Court to do so because I find that it is related.

Secondly there's all sorts of these legal concepts of res judicata and the fact that there's simply no legal basis on the face of the complaint to support a recognized claim for relief. So there are many reasons why I think that it should be dismissed; however, you have tendered to the Court a proposed amended complaint, and I don't have the time in the middle of this hearing to sit down and read over that and study it, but I'm going to.

I'm going to take this matter under advisement, and I'11 be issuing a formal order at a later date on each of those three items, and I'11 reserve judgment on your amended complaint until $I$ read it. But even though we've not set down to compose that order, I can tell you that it will be this Court's finding that you have violated this Court's order by filing this lawsuit without getting advance permission. You were enjoined and ordered not to do that, and you did it anyway .

Whether and what sort of contempt or sanctions that results in $I$ want to give some more thought to. I can also tel1 you that your current complaint that $I$ have read that I'm going to find that it should be dismissed. If there's something new in your proposed amended complaint, then I'11 deal with that whenever $I$ read it. But as it currently stands, there's just not anything there, Mr. Neeley.

I'm going to temper those findings with some other findings, which are $I$ believe that you're an intelligent person; I believe that you have some sincerely held beliefs; I believe that, as you have indicated, that you do have, to some extent or degree, some neurological impairments -- strike that -- neurocognitive impairments. And I don't know to what extent that is at play here, but $I$ think that it may very well be, and I'm going to take that into consideration.

What I need to get you to do more than anything is to
tell me whether it is your current plan to keep on filing these types of lawsuits or not. Because if you tell me that it is, then I'm going to have to include some sanctions because that's the only way that I know to get your attention.

MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, my belief right now is that it is not correct what they're doing. However, apparently law is not the -- I am not going to do anything else, is that I am done. I apologize for having not -- I have abused the Court. I had no idea that's what I was doing, and I apologize. I will not do that again.

THE COURT: Okay. And you're going to make that -- you're under oath. Are you making that commitment to me right now?

MR. NEELEY: I am under oath. I am not going to sue Google or Microsoft or anybody else. In fact, I'm never going to sue anybody because it just doesn't -- I was wrong. I mean, as much money, I have borrowed money to -- you know, I mean, I'11 be paying for this for a long time just the way it is right now. So I am not going to come back.

THE COURT: All right. Very well.
The Court will take the matters identified in the show cause order under advisement at this point. We'11 be issuing a formal order.

In the order to appear and show cause, the Court indicated that the named defendants need not appear pending
further orders of the Court and that order will remain in effect.

Anything further, Mr. Neeley?
MR. NEELEY: Nothing other than I would like to beg the Court for leniency on monetary because -- as far as how much of a fine. Because having paid fine fees twice and everything else, $I$ have really no means of paying a fine, and $I$ guess ask the Court for its mercy.

THE COURT: Al1 right. Thank you, Mr. Neeley. I'11 take that under consideration.
(Proceedings concluded at 3:19 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, Dana Hayden, Federal Official Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Dated this 2nd day of May, 2014.

DANA HAYDEN CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT LS NO. 714


Dana Hayden, CCR, RMR, CRR Federal Official Court Reporter

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